Think Tank Meeting 12 Jan 2006

Summary: The think tank discussed David W. Robson’s article, “Cognitive Rigidity: methods to overcome it.” In the 12 JAN 2006 meeting the members began to try to narrow the focus on innovative and effective tools to combat bad biases. However, the general consensus was that the tools we had found are somewhat elementary and do not seem to demonstrate the ability to totally address the dangers of “bad bias” the group has identified. The group discussed Robson’s example of a bus stop shelter company, which was able to break into, and take the market by offering free bus stop shelters by charging advertisers for space on the new shelters. The group used this example as a benchmark for fundamental paradigm shift. The discussion lead to possible ways the current intelligence paradigms could be shifted. Mark Blair suggested that anti-terrorism intelligence efforts in the future should focus on “ideology.” He asserted that ideology itself could be considered an enemy with centers of gravity, critical vulnerabilities, etc., and that though an intelligence process we could reveal ways to affect the replication, and adoption of ideologies that fuel terrorism. He stated that a concept like this could represent a shift to a more effective paradigm of intelligence. Halen Allison pointed out that DARPA is a good example of organization that is looking for these new paradigms.
Prof Hoff pointed out that the group might gain dividends in its specific efforts, if it were to pinpoint skills or traits that can be taught to the analyst that would improve his/her ability to identify and combat bad biases. The think tank is attempting to zero in on these psychological qualities that can be taught to reach these ends.

Minutes of Think Tank Meeting 12 Jan 2006

1) Meet and Greet

2) Members in Attendance:

a) Professor Hoff, Director of Mercyhurst Psych Dept

b) Halen Allison, Student Director of Research, Intel Studies Dept

c) Mark Blair, Intel Studies Dept

3) Discussion: Members discussed “Cognitive Rigidity: methods to overcome it”, by David W. Robson

a) (Prof Hoff) Do any of you know who this guy (David W. Robson) is?

b) Group: No not really, sounds familiar though.

c) (Halen Allison) We have identified all of these “bad” biases, but what is the point? We can teach analyst about these issues, and tell them they should avoid them, but is that really going to help? We need to come up with ways, techniques, or procedures to combat these bad biases, or at least find ways to identify them in the analytical process. A lot of the concepts we have come across seem to be a little elementary, and may have a limited effectiveness.

d) (Mark Blair) I agree, but I think some of the concepts from this article are useful. I like the concept of surfacing. It gives us a target to shoot for. How do we “surface” biases so we can determine whether they are good or bad. I also like the “invisible hand” concept. I think this is truly brilliant when considering biases. It not only insinuates that there is an invisible force guiding analysis, but it also insinuates that decisions are made in the “best interest” of something. Previously we discussed that people become emotionally tied to paradigms. We began to describe standardized, systematic, time proven ways of doing things by their psychological effects on those who subscribe to them. We proposed that these paradigms help us define our world, and “gave us a comfortable ground” (Prof Hoff). The concept that a bias can be not only subconscious (or at least beyond our unexamined awareness), but also something that acts to preserve our comfortable ground is telling. In other words it acts in our best psychological interest…perhaps.

e) (Halen Allison) But how do we know when to “surface” our biases. Don’t we assume they are always present? Paradigms provide us with a common ground and stability, which is good, but we must be able to change, and adapt quickly. We should be built that way. If you are winning… you stay. If you are losing… you must leave the paradigm you are using. Gladwell’s Blink concept indicates that too many precautions may waste our time.

f) (?) Gladwell’s was referring to personal decisions, or perceptions. When the stakes get too high do we really want to rely on instant intuition?

g) (Mark Blair) I think the issue is whether your “instant intuitions” stand on firm ground. Robson, in his article, refers to the “tyranny of experience.” I love this, but I would probably state it as “the tyranny of expertise.” The problem is that expertise or experts are extremely difficult to challenge. Doesn’t expertise itself serve as a bias, and therefore shouldn’t it be held under the microscope as well. Scientists normally have to back up their hypotheses with empirical evidence. And their hypotheses are judged on how narrowly the empirical foundation can be interpreted. Which is to say, if the evidence can be interpreted to indicate other findings than the proposed hypothesis’s validity is reduced. Experts, like experts of… say Arab culture, don’t have the same minimally interpretable empirical foundations (typically). Which is evident by the wide range of dissent among experts. Therefore, their analysis/opinions should be challenged, but what ability does an analyst have to redress expert analysis?

h) (Prof Hoff) What did you all think of Robson’s real world example of cognitive rigidity in the company that made bus stop stands/shelters? Robson explains how the company who held the market share on bus stop shelters couldn’t even conceive the possibility of providing free bus stop shelters. The new company had gone to the base of their logic/reasoning and actually changed the customer base. (By charging advertisers fees to place ads on the shelters. The result was that the new company could provide, maintain, and replace bus shelters at no expense to the transit authority.)

i) (Halen Allison) It certainly made it easier to understand what Robson was proposing. I think we could see these things historically. I think the same thing could be said about the Roman and Ottoman Empire. When each empire came to power they were revolutionary thinkers, and great organizers, but they both got rooted into a way of thinking, and failed to adapt to the changing environment. The Ottomans fail to adjust geopolitical climate of Europe, and the Romans failed to adjust to the era of Barbarian hordes. Of course, this is a simplified explanation and I’m sure such comments can be made about almost any lasting empire; however I think this makes a valid point.

j) (Mark Blair) This is starting to remind me of last week’s conversation, and how we described the resistance to change of old paradigms. And that our current intelligence paradigm has been pushed beyond its abilities.

k) (?) Yes, but the good ol’boy network is still in play. Our community as a profession is in many ways in its infancy, our parameters, regulations etc. are still not stable. We got a sucker punch from 9/11; the question is whether or not the community truly has the flexibility to change.

l) (Mark Blair) I have to plug my own research for a second here. Al Qaeda had training camps, financial logistics, weapons, etc. When the US went in to Afghanistan we left bomb craters where the training camps were, we confiscated tons of weapons, we dismantled many financial apparatuses, and we scattered al Qaeda members to the corners of the Earth. There is a huge dedicated intelligence community relentlessly perusing them and their financiers. So why do we still hear the name al Qaeda, what is left? Why is the problem still growing? Why can’t we identify targets that, when destroyed/reduce combat power, instead of create more? I think we need to shift our target. Some say intelligence needs to target the terrorists, some say we need to target the potential or future terrorists, and even more claim we need to target societies. I say we need to target the al Qaeda’s legacy: their ideology. I think our true enemy (ideology) predates and has or at least will post date al Qaeda. We need to understand how people adopt and replicate ideologies. An ideology has an anatomy. They have resistance mechanisms, replication enhancers, etc. If we can retrofit our intelligence models, specifically the Clausewitzian model, we can identify centers of gravity, critical vulnerabilities, critical capabilities, etc, we could develop intelligence to combat the adoption and replication of the ideologies that fuel terrorism. We could provide support for psyops efforts to construct competing ideologies. I believe that only if we address the ideological forces behind terrorism can we reduce its occurrence.

m) (Prof Hoff) Where and when does this shift in paradigms occur?

n) (Mark Blair) They occur when the old paradigm is stressed. When the old paradigm begins to fail to address modern problems, when its shortcomings are exposed. Now.

o) (?) These things are born out of necessity. There must be a legitimate need.

p) (Halen Allison) These guys in this new company needed a way to break into the market. This put them in a unique situation and they were able to engage in counterintuitive thinking.

q) (Mark Blair) Innovation is its own reinforcer. In fact in our culture innovation is instilled at a very young age as a natural reinforcer. However, that explanation would take awhile.

r) (Prof Hoff) Variation is natural. When one option has worked in the past you will use it again. But what happens when it stops working… do you try to force it to work. I think often that is the case.

s) (?) The bus shelter business was motivated by sheer profit. The old bus shelter company was fixated on it. It had no reason to look beyond their current situation.

t) (Prof Hoff) There is always someone out there that may seek variation. That’s why Robson suggests provocateurs in the mix. These provocateurs are put into groups of analysts or what not and poke holes in theories and engage in counterintuitive thinking. These kinds of individuals keep the ground fertile.

u) (Halen Allison) But would the provocateurs also begin to work into the mix and perhaps lose their imagination? Perhaps they should be rotated.

v) (Prof Hoff) That’s a good possibility. Group may become immune to the provocateurs or vice versa.

w) (Mark Blair) But where is the jumping off point? Some assumptions have to be made in analysis; some gaps in information must be accepted. I fear that a provocateur may just trip up the works. Analyst have to hurdler boulders, they can’t afford to trip over pebbles. I would fear that provocateurs may nit pick analysts into ineffectiveness.

x) (Halen Allison) I think the provocateurs are meant to target big picture analysis instead of small stuff, its more strategic than tactical, relatively speaking.

y) (?) It doesn’t have to be a perfect plan, and devil’s advocates don’t have to be hecklers.

z) (Halen Allison) These elements just need to be present. Robson’s concept of “green houses or incubator teams” inside a company for the purposes of developing new concepts, which can then be analyzed for there validity may present one of these elements. For instance, geology to the best of my knowledge has or had no theoretical wing. I read an article were a geologist, I think his name was Gold, hypothesized that we would find dust on the moon. The overwhelming majority of geologists of the day thought this was absurd, they expect to find only rocks. Well of course we know now that Gold was right. If organizations or even practices (such as different fields of scientific study) lack these elements of provocative thought they are likely to experience the problems we have identified.

aa) (?) The new OSINT agency was dismissed by the other agencies until they recently after they turned up a picture of an Iranian nuclear reactor that someone had posted on a blog. There is strong resistance to change, but results are results!

bb) (Halen Allison) DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) is a great example of an organization that is doing things right. They often just give new innovations or ideas to related agencies or organizations and tell them to play with it and see what they think. That kind of openness to innovation is good to combat these the bad biases we have identified.

cc) (Mark Blair) Yes, but what’s new about this article? What innovations are present? When we first begin reading about these ideas I got goose bumps thinking of what lies beyond these basic concepts, but we seem to be finding the same ideas in varying forms. These concepts are beginning to look like that patchwork of dying paradigms that we talked about earlier. Where is the real innovation? How are we going to create real solutions, not fix broken ones. Is there a need for a new solution?

dd) (Prof Hoff) Well what do you guys think about the tools that Robson mentions?

ee) (Halen Allison) Robson’s concept of ideas being spun out is interesting. That is to say that these ideas are probed and deeply inspected before they are cast off, and not simply dismissed because they don’t fit the current way of thinking.

ff) (Mark Blair) The concept of H1, H2, and H3 teams (Horizon 1: analysis of known architectures of threat, Horizon 2: Paradigms of “known” and new architecture of threat “spar” for legitimacy, Horizon 3: Intel analysis envisions new architectures of threat) is a positive structure I think. The Marine Corps has a similar, although somewhat shorter in its time frame, construct. An intel shop will have a pre-op intel efforts component, current ops/analysis component (watch officers), collections (management of current inflowing intel), and a future ops section. I think the H1, H2, H3 allows progression without losing sight of the here and know, but it conceivably requires more staff, and possibly even different kinds of people. From my experience, some of the analysts I worked with simply couldn’t demonstrate the imaginative, and counter-intuitive thinking necessary for an H3-type cell. Would we need to conduct psychological evaluations to determine who is suitable for these different groups?

gg) (Prof Hoff) I think that is the wrong way to look at it. I think we need to view these qualifications as trainable traits that we can add to an individual’s repertoires of intellectual skills.

hh) (Mark Blair) There is also the question of emotional attachment to current ways of thinking. How do we teach people to let go of what has worked in the past? How do we teach these traits, and abilities? The company in the real world example created their own market. Doesn’t it take fresh eyes to do this? Can we teach people to regain fresh eyes?

ii) (Halen Allison) First we need to teach “the boss” to sanction dissent on the devils advocate… sort of sanction dissent on dissent.

jj) (Prof Hoff) Mercyhurst has a core curriculum, which includes philosophy, religious studies, social sciences, etc. What purpose does this serve?

kk) (Halen Allison) This over all knowledge is helpful for understanding our environment.

ll) (Prof Hoff) Where are these assumptions articulated? Are they in the college catalogue? How is this curriculum shaping the minds of the students who study it? Is there more value to learning about philosophy, and religion than learning… say accounting? (Prof Hoff was starting to be met with confused stares) You see what I’m doing? I’m trying to ask provocative questions. (Laughter) The point is that the core curriculum is teaching its student multiple ways to view a problem, by exposing them to a variety of paradigms, and giving them the opportunity to engage these issues on multiple fronts. This necessarily gives fresh eyes to the individual.

mm) (Mark Blair) Okay we are developing a curriculum. How do we teach this provocative questioning skill? Are provocative questions the “reset button?”

nn) (Halen Allison) And who will want to acquire this knowledge? Traditionalists may view these new concepts with suspicion.

oo) (Mark Blair) And in fact, can we teach this?

pp) (Prof Hoff) We can come up with examples for this. When you find yourself subscribing to a position, consider the opposite.

qq) (Mark Blair) An ideological red cell? A Hegelian perspective of scientific methods.

rr) (Prof Hoff) Exactly, kind an anti-thesis concept. Can you prove support for the opposite position from where you stand?



4) The Think Tank adjourned, and the members agreed that further discussion of Robson article should be conducted at the next meeting. In addition the think tank agreed to review “Extending Heuer’s Analysis of competing Hypotheses Method to Support Complex Decisions Analysis” by Marco Valtorta, Jiangbo Dang, Hrishikesh Goradia, Jingshan Huang, and Micheal Huhns.

Think Tank Meeting 5 Jan 2006

Summary:

Prior to the 05JAN2006 Think Tank meeting, members reviewed two articles: “Combating Cognitive Biases in Information Retrieval” by Rafael Alonso, and Hua Li and “Observations on ‘Cognitive Factors in Design’” by Thomas T. Hewitt. The group discussed the method by which the Anti-Bias Mechanism (ABM) (in the former article) worked to develop an alternative query in Internet searches conducted by analysts. The group agreed that a “Google” styled evaluation of information, found to be commonly relevant by other analysts (unions), has some utility. However, the group was cautious in claiming that this system can effectively fight analyst bias. The group felt this would be ineffective at combating and in fact may promote groupthink.
The group also discussed “problem-solving schemas”, from the latter article. As a person encounters problems, and more importantly successfully solves problems, they develop “schemas” (or standardized structures for solving problems). Try this equation: A+2b+a=? The average person would attempt to solve this problem using an algebraic problem-solving schema. A person may ignore the anomaly that there is no integer or value on one side of the equation and therefore the problem is in its most reduced form. A person may try to fix the problem to fit their schema by adding an integer: A+2b+a=X, however this is not the original query and they have merely “patched up” the problem to fit the schema. The answer is Abba. We would attempt to argue that this problem is incorrectly stated, and that although it is not a complete algebraic equation it contains algebraic language (2b). However, this only emphasizes the point. Although some of the question fits the algebraic model for problem solving, the anomaly tells us we are using the wrong schema. Here in lies the problem: if we misidentify the query and apply the wrong schema to solve it we will inevitably have errors in our analytical processes, regardless of their accuracy. From these concepts, the group identified what it considered to be one of the most dangerous biases: the “paradigm”. It was the belief of the group that the ABM, or other known anti-bias techniques could not redress this bias.
Our answer to this bias: imagination. In past meetings the group has discussed what makes good analysts. The analysts stated that analytical sciences and techniques could be taught to make acceptable analysts, however certain qualities of exemplar analysts are innate. Many historical “failures of intelligence” (9/11, Pearl Harbor, Iran [Shah/Ayatollah], etc.) are characterized as “failures of imagination.” The think tank believes it may be extremely beneficial to identify some “jumping off points” between empirical analyses and imaginative analyses, doctrinal and counter intuitive thinking. The group poses the question: “Can we identify turning points or cues in the analysis process when the current use of a paradigm should be questioned?” One possible answer to this is the systematic search and identification process of anomalies. The think tank concluded with the assertion that, perhaps, analysis should be “revolutionary” in nature. That is to say, it should be fearless, and ready to question the very foundations of its own reasoning, and cast off paradigms, which have in the past proven fruitful. This again brings into question the validity of “experts”, and experienced analysts. The think tank wonders what effects long-term dedications to paradigms have on the analyst. We pose a series of questions for further inspection using primarily psychological principals: Were analysts so engrossed in the era of counter-Soviet intelligence ready for 9/11? Who is the more effective analyst: the Lance Corporal (entry level analyst), or the Colonel (experienced analyst)? What weight should “expert” opinions have on analysis? Can “expert” knowledge be presented in a digestible manner, which a non-expert analyst may use effectively? How can we know when and how to be imaginative? How do we learn to be revolutionaries, and how do we know when it is appropriate?
Professor Hoff was careful to mention that biases have evolved in the human psyche as survival tools or techniques, which improve cognitive abilities. There is a question of what extent human intuition can be trusted. The group has resolved itself to consider biases to have positive and negative qualities based on their context.
We hope to answer these questions by reviewing existing work in the field (such as Heuer’s book Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, the afore mentioned articles, etc.) and new applications of existing psychological principals. To this end we are resolved.

MINUTES OF THINK TANK MEETING 06JAN2005

1) MEET AND GREET

2) ATTENDANCE:

Prof Hoff
Halen Allison
Lance Ramsey
Mark Blair

3) OPENING SHOTS:

a) (Mark Blair): I wanted to remind everyone that Heuer’s book Psychology of Intelligence Analysis is available on line at http://www.cia.gov/csi/books/19104/ In the future this book will be a subject of review for us, and you may wish to do some preliminary reading or print it out ahead of time.

b) (Mark Blair): I would also like to point out that the Mercyhurst Intelligence Studies Dept as published a new book elaborating on Heuer’s concept: Analysis of Completing Hypothesis (ACH), entitled Structured Analysis of Competing Hypothesis. I have acquired a copy for Prof Hoff.

c) (Mark Blair): Gentlemen, Halen Allison and I have created an online blog for the “Mercyhurst Psychology of Intelligence Analysis Think Tank.” It can be found at http://www.psychintel.blogspot.com/. Please go online and review it. Ensure that there are no issues that we have discussed absent, and ensure that it properly represents our meetings to your recollection.

i. Once I have a thumbs up from all of you I would like to send out invitations to the faculty of the Psychology Dept and the Intelligence Studies program to review it and give feed back.
ii. Furthermore I would like to invite Col Walters of III Marine Expeditionary Force and Col Millen of the Strategic Studies Institute to review our blog and leave feedback.
iii. Finally, I believe Dr Owoc of the Anthropology Department could provide us with unique viewpoints and exposure to paralell concepts such as human agency. I also believe any curriculums that may result from our work may have interest to anthropology students. An early interaction with the Anthropology Department will allow us to address their concerns and interests in this subject. For these reasons I would like to invite Dr Owoc to join our online dialogue.
iv. I would like unanimous consent for these invitations. (Unanimous consent is given).
v. I would also like to encourage anyone else with suggestions or possible contributors to bring them up in this or future meetings.

4) The two text were discussed simultaneously.

a. (Prof Hoff) What did each of you think about the “Combating Cognitive Biases in Information Retrieval?”

b. (Halen Allison) I think this has great potential for document exploitation. I would like to get a hold of this program to test it. I think it would greatly benefit our efforts in the Venona Project. But, I’m not sure it would combat some of the more standardized biases analysts face, such as mirror image biases etc.

c. (Prof Hoff) Maybe someone can explain this system a little better for me. It reminds me of Amazon.com. When you purchase a book it comes up with a list of books that people bought who also bought the book you are purchasing. Conceivably it then monitors what books from that list are bought by others or even just “click on.” Then it refines the list accordingly.

d. (Mark Blair) Yes that was my take. I noticed, to my understanding, striking similarities to how Google works. Google monitors search parameters, again to the best of my understanding, and then records what people select or click on. Through this learning process Google learns what results are relevant to search parameters. The Anti-Bias Mechanism (ABM) records queries which individual analyst rate in terms of relevance. The common findings, or unions, are assumed to be unbiased. These unions form the bases for the development of alternative queries, with which the ABM returns findings on the original query along with findings of the alternative maps. These findings are considered “immunized.” The ABS uses the search parameters to identify other related and relevant search parameters to theoretically provide results of alternative questions. That is to say the system assumes the question/queries may be biased or exclusive and not include other possibilities. Like, asking, “Where are the terrorists”, this question does not provide for the possibility that there are no terrorists present.

e. (Prof Hoff) In the Amazon example there may be a book you would like that no one has purchased and the system cannot provide for that contingency. Plus there is the potential that these findings may serve as social pressure. (Especially with the less experienced analyst.) By providing the most viewed or best rated (in terms of relevancy) a person may be subject to a social pressure to assume this view. I could serve as a computerize groupthink or ban wagon effect.

f. (Mark Blair) I agree, but I’m not sure the alternative results are identified as being different from the result based on the original query. I think that the ABM may also have a monitoring utility. If people can monitor the findings of the ABM it may be possible to identify groupthink or common fundamental errors. Especially if it has a wide dissemination. It may be able to identify “regional”, that is interoffice or interagency, etc. beliefs. By studying and comparing this data we may be able to identify and resolve differences in analysis in the intelligence community as a whole. It may also reveal failures of communication between agencies. For instance, one agency may have info or intel that they are using in their analysis that another agency is without. A system that could identify discrepancies in analysis may also identify discrepancies in information. I think also that the process involved may be helpful to understand and could possibly be utilized outside of the computer realm.

g. (Halen Allison) Yes, concepts like “Devils Advocate” should be part of analysis standard operating procedures (SOPs).

h. (Mark Blair) This is of key importance. The other paper “Observation of Cognitive Factors” mentions problem-solving schemas. People develop these problem solving schemas from encounters with problems in their past. The danger of biased analysis lies in the misidentification of a problem, and the application of an inappropriate problem-solving schema to a non-related problem. Consider the equation A+2b+a=. The majority of people, presumably, would, at least initially, adopt an algebraic problem-solving schema. Many may ignore the lack of an value after the equation (i.e. =2 or X). A person may try to fix the problem by adding an integer such as A+2b+a=X. However, they are misapplying an inappropriate problem-solving schema to a problem. The answer is, of course, Abba your favorite and mine. So the question, in this case, is not over the nonsensical form of the question, yet a question of what do you bring to the table?

i. (Prof Hoff) I think we should be careful here. Biases evolved for a purpose. Biases are adaptive and not necessarily bad. Systems designed to remove biases could inevitably be harmful in some cases. We should consider positive and negative transfer. (Psych definition from Contemporary Behavior Therapy by Spiegler & Guevremont: Transfer- Process in which what is learned and practiced in one setting [such as therapy] carries over to other settings [such as home].) We may gain from considering the Blink Approach, by Malcolm Gladwell? His studies ask, “To what extent we can trust human intuition.” One danger we must take a look at is the existence of paradigms. Take scientific paradigms for instance. When some one subscribes to a paradigm, they not only become rationally tied to it, but also emotionally tied to it. Paradigms are used to define the world around you, and the way you conduct yourself. Paradigms may start to have flaws or anomalies. There may be things or instances that are the exceptions to the paradigm. Those who are considerably invested in the paradigm may begin to “patch up” the paradigm. But pretty soon you have patches everywhere as the paradigm continues to fail in other situations. The young guys, new to the field, don’t have as many problems with this. It’s the old guys who can’t let go of the old paradigms who push these paradigms beyond their validity. It’s the young guys, who based on the old guys work, break the mold and bring on new paradigms.

j. (Lance Ramsey) I agree it is often the ones who are fresh to a field to precipitate the evolution of the way we think.

k. (Prof Hoff) But it’s more than that. Its not evolution, its revolution man! The old way is completely cast off in favor of a new and better paradigm that is not in conflict with the anomalies of the old paradigm that accumulate over time. Take Einstein of instance: How did Einstein cast of the old Newtonian view of physics and radically redefine the universe. It’s that fundamental change of the basics that constitutes revolution. The old rules didn’t work anymore so he reinvented the concepts of physics, for instance: relativity. It’s imagination that allows you to go beyond a currently excepted paradigm. History has proven that it’s difficult to go beyond these paradigms. Imagine the first time it was suggested that the Earth was round or the Earth revolved around the Sun and not vice versa.

l. (Mark Blair) If it is a question of revolution, well we find ourselves on the precipice of revolution. After the 9/11, the WMD question, etc. anomalies have present themselves in the old paradigm of intelligence and everyone is scrambling to patch it up. I believe that the “good stuff” lies in the details. That is to say, often the bricks at the bottom of the wall are the ones most likely to weaken the wall. But how do we learn, and teach others to have imaginative processes that are able to reach to the very foundations of thought and problem solving to identify these anomalies?

m. (Prof Hoff) This is the question that many ask. You hear it all the time. Bosses in a board meeting ask, “Lets think outside the box”, only to be met with silence. Paradigms are often a question of comfort. The ABM gives us the terrain we are comfortable in, but it can’t lead to radical anti-biases mechanisms. It may generate ideas or directions we haven’t thought of but I don’t think it gives us new eyes.

n. (?) We have new interests in critical thinking, which I think is good, but its missing a creative quality.

o. (Mark Blair) How do we regard this critical vs. imaginative thinking? Where is the line, and how do we identify it? Can we identify a point where one type of thinking is more appropriate than the other?

p. (Prof Hoff) I think these two types of thinking can be complimentary. We may consider anomaly centric thinking or imaginative thinking. That is we may identify anomalies and then try to go into new, unexplained territory through an imaginative process.

q. (Mark Blair) Often this is how analysts think. We ask ourselves: “What do I know?” “What don’t I know?” etc. There was an example Prof Grabelski gave in one of his presentations which demonstrates this point. A young girl went to her mother's funeral. Though sadden she met a man she had never seen before. She became convinced the he was the man for her, however she did not get his phone number before leaving. For the next couple weeks she fell into depression. Two weeks after her mother’s funeral, the young girl murdered her sister. Why? When I heard this story I immediately zeroed in on the strange man. For me the relationship of the strange man to the family was an anomaly. It was what “I don’t know.” I was but a hairs distance from figuring out the entire case. However, there was a failure of imagination. I assumed there was an answer to this question. Someone knew this man, or knew why this man was at the funeral. However, if someone knew the man the young girl would have, conceivably, asked everyone and gotten in touch with him. So the young girl has the same issue as I do. Yet, the man for some reason knew the family or at least the mother, and cared enough to come to her funeral. So the young girl deduced that he would also come to her sister’s funeral. So she murdered her sister. Perhaps, if we can identify anomalies then that, in itself, is an indicator to turn on the imagination, and let go of the paradigms. I guess that seems rather obvious.

r. (Prof Hoff) I think it is clear that old paradigms are not only captivating of those who have used them for an extended period of time, but it renders the users incapable of understanding news ideas. (Provided they can’t let go of the old paradigm.)

5) Next week, Mercyhurst Psychology of Intelligence Think Tank Meeting 12Jan2006: The group decided to review “Cognitive Rigidity: methods to overcome it” by David W. Robson for next week.

6) Closing Comments: Thank you Gentlemen for attending this meeting. Thank you to everyone who may review our minutes. We would like to invite feedback from all who feel so inclined.

Think Tank Meeting 6 Dec 2005

Summary:

Prior to the meeting, members reviewed an article by Ross Stapleton-Gray, Ph.D., CISSP entitled “Watchin’ the Analyst.” The full text of this article is available in appendix A, at the end of this text. Discussion Points are as follows:

1. Right to privacy and clearances: What expectation of privacy should a person granted a clearance have?
a. The analysts agree that persons who are awarded clearances necessarily give up some expectation of privacy. The questionare (EPSQ- SF 86) of a clearance investigation is by nature a declaration that the subject of the investigation has nothing to hide.

2. Compartmentalization: Restrictions across compartmental lines may encourage unofficial venues of communication (i.e. Blogs, Chat rooms).
a. Compartmentalization has traditionally and in contemparay times been viewed as intrinsic to securty. In post 9/11 days compartmentalization has been frowned upon. Decenters have sighted lack of inter-agency communication and accessibility as a significant contributor to intelligence professionals' failure to predict the attacks of September 11, 2001. As the Stapleton article points out compartmentalization also promote back channel communication by intel professionals.



Minutes of Think Tank Meeting 6 Dec 2005:

1. Meet and Greet

2. Members in attendance:

a. Professor Hoff, Director of Mercyhurst Psych Dept
b. Halen Allison, Student Director of Research, Intel Studies Dept
c. Lance Ramsey, Intel Studies Dept
d. Mark Blair, Intel Studies Dept


2. Discussion: Members discussed the problems and logistics of teaching a class derived from a curriculum for the psychology of intelligence analysis.

a. (Prof Hoff) The Psych Dept has a limited faculty.
b. (Mark Blair) Although at this early juncture the only official feedback we have gotten for the potential curriculum is that it will definitely be considered for an elective. However, from the feedback I have gotten from some of the faculty, I feel there is a definite potential for such a curriculum to become a core class of future Intel Studies Degree Programs. If it is an elective or if it becomes a core curriculum of the intel program, there will be a lot of students, and we may have an easier time justifying dedicating limited faculty to teach the course.
c. (Halen Allison) ~This is not the only utility for a class such as this. A five-day seminar over the summer may prove fruitful. Such a seminar could be taught to, not only, Intel students, but may also attract analysts from the agencies and other organizations.
d. (Mark Blair & Prof Hoof [in a later conversation]) (Hoff) ~We may bear more fruit to our efforts if we are able to appeal to other programs. If the title of the curriculum “the Psychology of Judgment and Decision-making” we may receive offering from other programs like anthropology, philosophy etc. (Mark Blair) There is a bit of a marketing mentality to my thoughts. I am even thinking there may be some interest in the political science dept. I believe the more appeal for this class we can produce, the more successful our efforts will be.
e. (Mark Blair) I am planning to either produce a news letter or briefings on a weekly basis to communicate the findings of the think tank meeting to the faculty of the intel department and allow them a redirect line of communication between the intel dept and the think tank. With the direct feedback and guidance of the intel faculty we may be able economize our efforts. (Prof Hoff) ~What about setting up a blog? A blog may make it easier for us all to communicate and reduce the amount of time individual members must dedicate to the production of briefing products.

Think Tank Meeting 1 Dec 2005

Minutes of Think Tank meeting 1 Dec 2005:


1. Meet and Greet


2. Members in Attendance:

a. Prof Robert Hoff, Director of Mercyhurst Psych Dept
b. Halen Allison, Student Director of Research, Intel Studies Dept
c. Lance Ramsey, Intel Studies Dept
e. Mark Blair, Intel Studies Dept


3. Discussion of each member’s understandings and desires of the out come of the think tank. Responses as follows:

a. Investigation of the utilities of psychological principals to intelligence analysis.
b. Advancement of individual knowledge and the enhancement of analytical abilities.
c. Advancement of the craft of intelligence itself.
d. Identification and/or formulation of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), to assess productions of intelligence, both retrospectively, and inclusive in the intelligence process.
e. Formulate a curriculum to enhance the Mercyhurst Intelligence Studies Program.
f. Enhance/Develop interoperability and academic cooperation between the Intelligence Studies Dept and the Psychology Dept.


4. Video: “Judgment and Decision Making”, available at Learner.org (http://learner.org/resources/series138.html program 11) The program provided an overview of several psychology principals of judgment and decision making. Discussion points are as follows:

a. Normative vs. Descriptive decision-making: How decisions ought to be made vs. how decisions are made. Intuitions may sometimes be correct yet they are often intrinsically wrong in their logic.
b. Available Heuristic: The principal that people make decisions based on readily available knowledge.
c. Reasoning by Representativeness or Similarity: When presented with a questions of probability people search for evidence in the question and try to match it with a similar answer. People are often more likely to give a more specific response that fits a stereotype ignoring a broader answer, which by nature is more probable.
d. Anchoring Effect: The principal that the question is posed with a parameter tends to “anchor” an estimative response. Responses, in general, will be pulled toward the parameter.
e. Risk Strategies: People are predictable when making choices which similar values. A person will favor a “sure thing” over a gamble if the outcome is a gain. A person will generally favor a gamble over a sure thing if the outcome is a loss.
f. Under certain knowable conditions intuitions should not be trusted; people are susceptible to predictable errors in decision-making. Knowing these predictable errors give us hope that we may be able to implement procedures to avoid these errors in decision making or at least identify situations in which a person is at risk of making these errors.
g. Groupthink: A condition in which like-minded people continually to reduce the lateral thought. This intellectual inbreeding produces very narrow and often unchallenged viewpoints.
h. Mind-guarding: Members of groupthink protect the status quo from any evidence to the contrary.
i. Devils Advocates and Dissenters: These two concepts are identified as effective tools to combat groupthink and mind-guarding.


5. The group then held a discussion on the points defined by the video.

a. The analysts were quick to point out that the craft of intelligence analysis is only concerned with descriptive assessments. And that any normative issues are only discussed is when giving descriptive analysis a query’s normative tendencies (i.e. cultural norms/ideology). Proper analysis absolves itself of the moral question and only describes what is evident.
b. The analysts also agreed that all of the predictable decision-making errors defined by the video could be found in the practice of analysis. The point was also made that rank and/or authority exacerbates these issues. Furthermore, that “experts” can often present such errors that go unopposed.
c. Reasoning by Representativeness or Similarity: Experts or high ranking members who are familiar with many similar requests for information (RFIs) or critical intelligence requirements (CIRs), may have developed a stereo-type of a culture of people, or a doctrine of a military force. Such expertise, while necessary and often provides extremely insightful analysis, may also run the risk of making decision-making errors. The analysts stated that these “experts” should play a supporting role for the analyst, and the analyst should be charged with making a sober analysis based on expert opinions, empirical evidence, and situational concerns.
d. Question from Professor Hoff: “Do any of you think there could have been instances of groupthink in the Bush administration in the question of WMDs in regards to the Iraq War?” Response: (Mark Blair): Of course. It is almost unavoidable. However, that doesn’t necessarily mean we can identify where and if the analytical process broke down. In fact the question, CIR, or RFI may be more at fault than the response from analysts. If the question, “Where are the WMDs?” is asked, a response of, “There are no WMDs” does not answer the RFI. Since I don’t know how the question was asked I cannot be sure if this is the case. The Bush administration does have divergence of opinion. The members who did not serve in Vietnam (Bush, Cheney, etc.) tend to be the “warhawks”; while the Vietnam vets (Powell, Armitage, etc.) tend to be more reluctant to go to war. So there is some dissention about policy in the Bush administration, which would combat groupthink; however there is an overall aire of American exceptionalism and a neo-manifest destiny feel to the Bush administration. Over all the think tank analysts agree that there was likely much pressure from above to come up with an analysis based on preconceived notions.
e. Review of Material for Next Meeting: The think tank then concluded they would review “Watchin’ the Analyst” by Ross Stapleton-Gray for next weeks meeting.

Purpose and Mission

PURPOSE: Assess and identify the applicability of psychological principals of decision-making to improve the craft of intelligence analysis for the purposes of developing a curriculum of The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis.

MISSION STATEMENT: It is our sincere belief that many well-established psychological principals of decision-making can combat the biases impeding sober and objective analyses of intelligent queries. We believe that if analysts are taught these principals they may enhance the analyst’s objective and subjective analytical abilities and elevate the profession of intelligence analysis as a whole. To this end we are resolved to develop such a curriculum and identify tools for the analyst to test the entire process of analysis from the intelligence requirement handed down to him/her to final conclusions.