Think Tank Meeting 12 Jan 2006
Summary: The think tank discussed David W. Robson’s article, “Cognitive Rigidity: methods to overcome it.” In the 12 JAN 2006 meeting the members began to try to narrow the focus on innovative and effective tools to combat bad biases. However, the general consensus was that the tools we had found are somewhat elementary and do not seem to demonstrate the ability to totally address the dangers of “bad bias” the group has identified. The group discussed Robson’s example of a bus stop shelter company, which was able to break into, and take the market by offering free bus stop shelters by charging advertisers for space on the new shelters. The group used this example as a benchmark for fundamental paradigm shift. The discussion lead to possible ways the current intelligence paradigms could be shifted. Mark Blair suggested that anti-terrorism intelligence efforts in the future should focus on “ideology.” He asserted that ideology itself could be considered an enemy with centers of gravity, critical vulnerabilities, etc., and that though an intelligence process we could reveal ways to affect the replication, and adoption of ideologies that fuel terrorism. He stated that a concept like this could represent a shift to a more effective paradigm of intelligence. Halen Allison pointed out that DARPA is a good example of organization that is looking for these new paradigms.
Prof Hoff pointed out that the group might gain dividends in its specific efforts, if it were to pinpoint skills or traits that can be taught to the analyst that would improve his/her ability to identify and combat bad biases. The think tank is attempting to zero in on these psychological qualities that can be taught to reach these ends.
Minutes of Think Tank Meeting 12 Jan 2006
1) Meet and Greet
2) Members in Attendance:
a) Professor Hoff, Director of Mercyhurst Psych Dept
b) Halen Allison, Student Director of Research, Intel Studies Dept
c) Mark Blair, Intel Studies Dept
3) Discussion: Members discussed “Cognitive Rigidity: methods to overcome it”, by David W. Robson
a) (Prof Hoff) Do any of you know who this guy (David W. Robson) is?
b) Group: No not really, sounds familiar though.
c) (Halen Allison) We have identified all of these “bad” biases, but what is the point? We can teach analyst about these issues, and tell them they should avoid them, but is that really going to help? We need to come up with ways, techniques, or procedures to combat these bad biases, or at least find ways to identify them in the analytical process. A lot of the concepts we have come across seem to be a little elementary, and may have a limited effectiveness.
d) (Mark Blair) I agree, but I think some of the concepts from this article are useful. I like the concept of surfacing. It gives us a target to shoot for. How do we “surface” biases so we can determine whether they are good or bad. I also like the “invisible hand” concept. I think this is truly brilliant when considering biases. It not only insinuates that there is an invisible force guiding analysis, but it also insinuates that decisions are made in the “best interest” of something. Previously we discussed that people become emotionally tied to paradigms. We began to describe standardized, systematic, time proven ways of doing things by their psychological effects on those who subscribe to them. We proposed that these paradigms help us define our world, and “gave us a comfortable ground” (Prof Hoff). The concept that a bias can be not only subconscious (or at least beyond our unexamined awareness), but also something that acts to preserve our comfortable ground is telling. In other words it acts in our best psychological interest…perhaps.
e) (Halen Allison) But how do we know when to “surface” our biases. Don’t we assume they are always present? Paradigms provide us with a common ground and stability, which is good, but we must be able to change, and adapt quickly. We should be built that way. If you are winning… you stay. If you are losing… you must leave the paradigm you are using. Gladwell’s Blink concept indicates that too many precautions may waste our time.
f) (?) Gladwell’s was referring to personal decisions, or perceptions. When the stakes get too high do we really want to rely on instant intuition?
g) (Mark Blair) I think the issue is whether your “instant intuitions” stand on firm ground. Robson, in his article, refers to the “tyranny of experience.” I love this, but I would probably state it as “the tyranny of expertise.” The problem is that expertise or experts are extremely difficult to challenge. Doesn’t expertise itself serve as a bias, and therefore shouldn’t it be held under the microscope as well. Scientists normally have to back up their hypotheses with empirical evidence. And their hypotheses are judged on how narrowly the empirical foundation can be interpreted. Which is to say, if the evidence can be interpreted to indicate other findings than the proposed hypothesis’s validity is reduced. Experts, like experts of… say Arab culture, don’t have the same minimally interpretable empirical foundations (typically). Which is evident by the wide range of dissent among experts. Therefore, their analysis/opinions should be challenged, but what ability does an analyst have to redress expert analysis?
h) (Prof Hoff) What did you all think of Robson’s real world example of cognitive rigidity in the company that made bus stop stands/shelters? Robson explains how the company who held the market share on bus stop shelters couldn’t even conceive the possibility of providing free bus stop shelters. The new company had gone to the base of their logic/reasoning and actually changed the customer base. (By charging advertisers fees to place ads on the shelters. The result was that the new company could provide, maintain, and replace bus shelters at no expense to the transit authority.)
i) (Halen Allison) It certainly made it easier to understand what Robson was proposing. I think we could see these things historically. I think the same thing could be said about the Roman and Ottoman Empire. When each empire came to power they were revolutionary thinkers, and great organizers, but they both got rooted into a way of thinking, and failed to adapt to the changing environment. The Ottomans fail to adjust geopolitical climate of Europe, and the Romans failed to adjust to the era of Barbarian hordes. Of course, this is a simplified explanation and I’m sure such comments can be made about almost any lasting empire; however I think this makes a valid point.
j) (Mark Blair) This is starting to remind me of last week’s conversation, and how we described the resistance to change of old paradigms. And that our current intelligence paradigm has been pushed beyond its abilities.
k) (?) Yes, but the good ol’boy network is still in play. Our community as a profession is in many ways in its infancy, our parameters, regulations etc. are still not stable. We got a sucker punch from 9/11; the question is whether or not the community truly has the flexibility to change.
l) (Mark Blair) I have to plug my own research for a second here. Al Qaeda had training camps, financial logistics, weapons, etc. When the US went in to Afghanistan we left bomb craters where the training camps were, we confiscated tons of weapons, we dismantled many financial apparatuses, and we scattered al Qaeda members to the corners of the Earth. There is a huge dedicated intelligence community relentlessly perusing them and their financiers. So why do we still hear the name al Qaeda, what is left? Why is the problem still growing? Why can’t we identify targets that, when destroyed/reduce combat power, instead of create more? I think we need to shift our target. Some say intelligence needs to target the terrorists, some say we need to target the potential or future terrorists, and even more claim we need to target societies. I say we need to target the al Qaeda’s legacy: their ideology. I think our true enemy (ideology) predates and has or at least will post date al Qaeda. We need to understand how people adopt and replicate ideologies. An ideology has an anatomy. They have resistance mechanisms, replication enhancers, etc. If we can retrofit our intelligence models, specifically the Clausewitzian model, we can identify centers of gravity, critical vulnerabilities, critical capabilities, etc, we could develop intelligence to combat the adoption and replication of the ideologies that fuel terrorism. We could provide support for psyops efforts to construct competing ideologies. I believe that only if we address the ideological forces behind terrorism can we reduce its occurrence.
m) (Prof Hoff) Where and when does this shift in paradigms occur?
n) (Mark Blair) They occur when the old paradigm is stressed. When the old paradigm begins to fail to address modern problems, when its shortcomings are exposed. Now.
o) (?) These things are born out of necessity. There must be a legitimate need.
p) (Halen Allison) These guys in this new company needed a way to break into the market. This put them in a unique situation and they were able to engage in counterintuitive thinking.
q) (Mark Blair) Innovation is its own reinforcer. In fact in our culture innovation is instilled at a very young age as a natural reinforcer. However, that explanation would take awhile.
r) (Prof Hoff) Variation is natural. When one option has worked in the past you will use it again. But what happens when it stops working… do you try to force it to work. I think often that is the case.
s) (?) The bus shelter business was motivated by sheer profit. The old bus shelter company was fixated on it. It had no reason to look beyond their current situation.
t) (Prof Hoff) There is always someone out there that may seek variation. That’s why Robson suggests provocateurs in the mix. These provocateurs are put into groups of analysts or what not and poke holes in theories and engage in counterintuitive thinking. These kinds of individuals keep the ground fertile.
u) (Halen Allison) But would the provocateurs also begin to work into the mix and perhaps lose their imagination? Perhaps they should be rotated.
v) (Prof Hoff) That’s a good possibility. Group may become immune to the provocateurs or vice versa.
w) (Mark Blair) But where is the jumping off point? Some assumptions have to be made in analysis; some gaps in information must be accepted. I fear that a provocateur may just trip up the works. Analyst have to hurdler boulders, they can’t afford to trip over pebbles. I would fear that provocateurs may nit pick analysts into ineffectiveness.
x) (Halen Allison) I think the provocateurs are meant to target big picture analysis instead of small stuff, its more strategic than tactical, relatively speaking.
y) (?) It doesn’t have to be a perfect plan, and devil’s advocates don’t have to be hecklers.
z) (Halen Allison) These elements just need to be present. Robson’s concept of “green houses or incubator teams” inside a company for the purposes of developing new concepts, which can then be analyzed for there validity may present one of these elements. For instance, geology to the best of my knowledge has or had no theoretical wing. I read an article were a geologist, I think his name was Gold, hypothesized that we would find dust on the moon. The overwhelming majority of geologists of the day thought this was absurd, they expect to find only rocks. Well of course we know now that Gold was right. If organizations or even practices (such as different fields of scientific study) lack these elements of provocative thought they are likely to experience the problems we have identified.
aa) (?) The new OSINT agency was dismissed by the other agencies until they recently after they turned up a picture of an Iranian nuclear reactor that someone had posted on a blog. There is strong resistance to change, but results are results!
bb) (Halen Allison) DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) is a great example of an organization that is doing things right. They often just give new innovations or ideas to related agencies or organizations and tell them to play with it and see what they think. That kind of openness to innovation is good to combat these the bad biases we have identified.
cc) (Mark Blair) Yes, but what’s new about this article? What innovations are present? When we first begin reading about these ideas I got goose bumps thinking of what lies beyond these basic concepts, but we seem to be finding the same ideas in varying forms. These concepts are beginning to look like that patchwork of dying paradigms that we talked about earlier. Where is the real innovation? How are we going to create real solutions, not fix broken ones. Is there a need for a new solution?
dd) (Prof Hoff) Well what do you guys think about the tools that Robson mentions?
ee) (Halen Allison) Robson’s concept of ideas being spun out is interesting. That is to say that these ideas are probed and deeply inspected before they are cast off, and not simply dismissed because they don’t fit the current way of thinking.
ff) (Mark Blair) The concept of H1, H2, and H3 teams (Horizon 1: analysis of known architectures of threat, Horizon 2: Paradigms of “known” and new architecture of threat “spar” for legitimacy, Horizon 3: Intel analysis envisions new architectures of threat) is a positive structure I think. The Marine Corps has a similar, although somewhat shorter in its time frame, construct. An intel shop will have a pre-op intel efforts component, current ops/analysis component (watch officers), collections (management of current inflowing intel), and a future ops section. I think the H1, H2, H3 allows progression without losing sight of the here and know, but it conceivably requires more staff, and possibly even different kinds of people. From my experience, some of the analysts I worked with simply couldn’t demonstrate the imaginative, and counter-intuitive thinking necessary for an H3-type cell. Would we need to conduct psychological evaluations to determine who is suitable for these different groups?
gg) (Prof Hoff) I think that is the wrong way to look at it. I think we need to view these qualifications as trainable traits that we can add to an individual’s repertoires of intellectual skills.
hh) (Mark Blair) There is also the question of emotional attachment to current ways of thinking. How do we teach people to let go of what has worked in the past? How do we teach these traits, and abilities? The company in the real world example created their own market. Doesn’t it take fresh eyes to do this? Can we teach people to regain fresh eyes?
ii) (Halen Allison) First we need to teach “the boss” to sanction dissent on the devils advocate… sort of sanction dissent on dissent.
jj) (Prof Hoff) Mercyhurst has a core curriculum, which includes philosophy, religious studies, social sciences, etc. What purpose does this serve?
kk) (Halen Allison) This over all knowledge is helpful for understanding our environment.
ll) (Prof Hoff) Where are these assumptions articulated? Are they in the college catalogue? How is this curriculum shaping the minds of the students who study it? Is there more value to learning about philosophy, and religion than learning… say accounting? (Prof Hoff was starting to be met with confused stares) You see what I’m doing? I’m trying to ask provocative questions. (Laughter) The point is that the core curriculum is teaching its student multiple ways to view a problem, by exposing them to a variety of paradigms, and giving them the opportunity to engage these issues on multiple fronts. This necessarily gives fresh eyes to the individual.
mm) (Mark Blair) Okay we are developing a curriculum. How do we teach this provocative questioning skill? Are provocative questions the “reset button?”
nn) (Halen Allison) And who will want to acquire this knowledge? Traditionalists may view these new concepts with suspicion.
oo) (Mark Blair) And in fact, can we teach this?
pp) (Prof Hoff) We can come up with examples for this. When you find yourself subscribing to a position, consider the opposite.
qq) (Mark Blair) An ideological red cell? A Hegelian perspective of scientific methods.
rr) (Prof Hoff) Exactly, kind an anti-thesis concept. Can you prove support for the opposite position from where you stand?
4) The Think Tank adjourned, and the members agreed that further discussion of Robson article should be conducted at the next meeting. In addition the think tank agreed to review “Extending Heuer’s Analysis of competing Hypotheses Method to Support Complex Decisions Analysis” by Marco Valtorta, Jiangbo Dang, Hrishikesh Goradia, Jingshan Huang, and Micheal Huhns.
Prof Hoff pointed out that the group might gain dividends in its specific efforts, if it were to pinpoint skills or traits that can be taught to the analyst that would improve his/her ability to identify and combat bad biases. The think tank is attempting to zero in on these psychological qualities that can be taught to reach these ends.
Minutes of Think Tank Meeting 12 Jan 2006
1) Meet and Greet
2) Members in Attendance:
a) Professor Hoff, Director of Mercyhurst Psych Dept
b) Halen Allison, Student Director of Research, Intel Studies Dept
c) Mark Blair, Intel Studies Dept
3) Discussion: Members discussed “Cognitive Rigidity: methods to overcome it”, by David W. Robson
a) (Prof Hoff) Do any of you know who this guy (David W. Robson) is?
b) Group: No not really, sounds familiar though.
c) (Halen Allison) We have identified all of these “bad” biases, but what is the point? We can teach analyst about these issues, and tell them they should avoid them, but is that really going to help? We need to come up with ways, techniques, or procedures to combat these bad biases, or at least find ways to identify them in the analytical process. A lot of the concepts we have come across seem to be a little elementary, and may have a limited effectiveness.
d) (Mark Blair) I agree, but I think some of the concepts from this article are useful. I like the concept of surfacing. It gives us a target to shoot for. How do we “surface” biases so we can determine whether they are good or bad. I also like the “invisible hand” concept. I think this is truly brilliant when considering biases. It not only insinuates that there is an invisible force guiding analysis, but it also insinuates that decisions are made in the “best interest” of something. Previously we discussed that people become emotionally tied to paradigms. We began to describe standardized, systematic, time proven ways of doing things by their psychological effects on those who subscribe to them. We proposed that these paradigms help us define our world, and “gave us a comfortable ground” (Prof Hoff). The concept that a bias can be not only subconscious (or at least beyond our unexamined awareness), but also something that acts to preserve our comfortable ground is telling. In other words it acts in our best psychological interest…perhaps.
e) (Halen Allison) But how do we know when to “surface” our biases. Don’t we assume they are always present? Paradigms provide us with a common ground and stability, which is good, but we must be able to change, and adapt quickly. We should be built that way. If you are winning… you stay. If you are losing… you must leave the paradigm you are using. Gladwell’s Blink concept indicates that too many precautions may waste our time.
f) (?) Gladwell’s was referring to personal decisions, or perceptions. When the stakes get too high do we really want to rely on instant intuition?
g) (Mark Blair) I think the issue is whether your “instant intuitions” stand on firm ground. Robson, in his article, refers to the “tyranny of experience.” I love this, but I would probably state it as “the tyranny of expertise.” The problem is that expertise or experts are extremely difficult to challenge. Doesn’t expertise itself serve as a bias, and therefore shouldn’t it be held under the microscope as well. Scientists normally have to back up their hypotheses with empirical evidence. And their hypotheses are judged on how narrowly the empirical foundation can be interpreted. Which is to say, if the evidence can be interpreted to indicate other findings than the proposed hypothesis’s validity is reduced. Experts, like experts of… say Arab culture, don’t have the same minimally interpretable empirical foundations (typically). Which is evident by the wide range of dissent among experts. Therefore, their analysis/opinions should be challenged, but what ability does an analyst have to redress expert analysis?
h) (Prof Hoff) What did you all think of Robson’s real world example of cognitive rigidity in the company that made bus stop stands/shelters? Robson explains how the company who held the market share on bus stop shelters couldn’t even conceive the possibility of providing free bus stop shelters. The new company had gone to the base of their logic/reasoning and actually changed the customer base. (By charging advertisers fees to place ads on the shelters. The result was that the new company could provide, maintain, and replace bus shelters at no expense to the transit authority.)
i) (Halen Allison) It certainly made it easier to understand what Robson was proposing. I think we could see these things historically. I think the same thing could be said about the Roman and Ottoman Empire. When each empire came to power they were revolutionary thinkers, and great organizers, but they both got rooted into a way of thinking, and failed to adapt to the changing environment. The Ottomans fail to adjust geopolitical climate of Europe, and the Romans failed to adjust to the era of Barbarian hordes. Of course, this is a simplified explanation and I’m sure such comments can be made about almost any lasting empire; however I think this makes a valid point.
j) (Mark Blair) This is starting to remind me of last week’s conversation, and how we described the resistance to change of old paradigms. And that our current intelligence paradigm has been pushed beyond its abilities.
k) (?) Yes, but the good ol’boy network is still in play. Our community as a profession is in many ways in its infancy, our parameters, regulations etc. are still not stable. We got a sucker punch from 9/11; the question is whether or not the community truly has the flexibility to change.
l) (Mark Blair) I have to plug my own research for a second here. Al Qaeda had training camps, financial logistics, weapons, etc. When the US went in to Afghanistan we left bomb craters where the training camps were, we confiscated tons of weapons, we dismantled many financial apparatuses, and we scattered al Qaeda members to the corners of the Earth. There is a huge dedicated intelligence community relentlessly perusing them and their financiers. So why do we still hear the name al Qaeda, what is left? Why is the problem still growing? Why can’t we identify targets that, when destroyed/reduce combat power, instead of create more? I think we need to shift our target. Some say intelligence needs to target the terrorists, some say we need to target the potential or future terrorists, and even more claim we need to target societies. I say we need to target the al Qaeda’s legacy: their ideology. I think our true enemy (ideology) predates and has or at least will post date al Qaeda. We need to understand how people adopt and replicate ideologies. An ideology has an anatomy. They have resistance mechanisms, replication enhancers, etc. If we can retrofit our intelligence models, specifically the Clausewitzian model, we can identify centers of gravity, critical vulnerabilities, critical capabilities, etc, we could develop intelligence to combat the adoption and replication of the ideologies that fuel terrorism. We could provide support for psyops efforts to construct competing ideologies. I believe that only if we address the ideological forces behind terrorism can we reduce its occurrence.
m) (Prof Hoff) Where and when does this shift in paradigms occur?
n) (Mark Blair) They occur when the old paradigm is stressed. When the old paradigm begins to fail to address modern problems, when its shortcomings are exposed. Now.
o) (?) These things are born out of necessity. There must be a legitimate need.
p) (Halen Allison) These guys in this new company needed a way to break into the market. This put them in a unique situation and they were able to engage in counterintuitive thinking.
q) (Mark Blair) Innovation is its own reinforcer. In fact in our culture innovation is instilled at a very young age as a natural reinforcer. However, that explanation would take awhile.
r) (Prof Hoff) Variation is natural. When one option has worked in the past you will use it again. But what happens when it stops working… do you try to force it to work. I think often that is the case.
s) (?) The bus shelter business was motivated by sheer profit. The old bus shelter company was fixated on it. It had no reason to look beyond their current situation.
t) (Prof Hoff) There is always someone out there that may seek variation. That’s why Robson suggests provocateurs in the mix. These provocateurs are put into groups of analysts or what not and poke holes in theories and engage in counterintuitive thinking. These kinds of individuals keep the ground fertile.
u) (Halen Allison) But would the provocateurs also begin to work into the mix and perhaps lose their imagination? Perhaps they should be rotated.
v) (Prof Hoff) That’s a good possibility. Group may become immune to the provocateurs or vice versa.
w) (Mark Blair) But where is the jumping off point? Some assumptions have to be made in analysis; some gaps in information must be accepted. I fear that a provocateur may just trip up the works. Analyst have to hurdler boulders, they can’t afford to trip over pebbles. I would fear that provocateurs may nit pick analysts into ineffectiveness.
x) (Halen Allison) I think the provocateurs are meant to target big picture analysis instead of small stuff, its more strategic than tactical, relatively speaking.
y) (?) It doesn’t have to be a perfect plan, and devil’s advocates don’t have to be hecklers.
z) (Halen Allison) These elements just need to be present. Robson’s concept of “green houses or incubator teams” inside a company for the purposes of developing new concepts, which can then be analyzed for there validity may present one of these elements. For instance, geology to the best of my knowledge has or had no theoretical wing. I read an article were a geologist, I think his name was Gold, hypothesized that we would find dust on the moon. The overwhelming majority of geologists of the day thought this was absurd, they expect to find only rocks. Well of course we know now that Gold was right. If organizations or even practices (such as different fields of scientific study) lack these elements of provocative thought they are likely to experience the problems we have identified.
aa) (?) The new OSINT agency was dismissed by the other agencies until they recently after they turned up a picture of an Iranian nuclear reactor that someone had posted on a blog. There is strong resistance to change, but results are results!
bb) (Halen Allison) DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) is a great example of an organization that is doing things right. They often just give new innovations or ideas to related agencies or organizations and tell them to play with it and see what they think. That kind of openness to innovation is good to combat these the bad biases we have identified.
cc) (Mark Blair) Yes, but what’s new about this article? What innovations are present? When we first begin reading about these ideas I got goose bumps thinking of what lies beyond these basic concepts, but we seem to be finding the same ideas in varying forms. These concepts are beginning to look like that patchwork of dying paradigms that we talked about earlier. Where is the real innovation? How are we going to create real solutions, not fix broken ones. Is there a need for a new solution?
dd) (Prof Hoff) Well what do you guys think about the tools that Robson mentions?
ee) (Halen Allison) Robson’s concept of ideas being spun out is interesting. That is to say that these ideas are probed and deeply inspected before they are cast off, and not simply dismissed because they don’t fit the current way of thinking.
ff) (Mark Blair) The concept of H1, H2, and H3 teams (Horizon 1: analysis of known architectures of threat, Horizon 2: Paradigms of “known” and new architecture of threat “spar” for legitimacy, Horizon 3: Intel analysis envisions new architectures of threat) is a positive structure I think. The Marine Corps has a similar, although somewhat shorter in its time frame, construct. An intel shop will have a pre-op intel efforts component, current ops/analysis component (watch officers), collections (management of current inflowing intel), and a future ops section. I think the H1, H2, H3 allows progression without losing sight of the here and know, but it conceivably requires more staff, and possibly even different kinds of people. From my experience, some of the analysts I worked with simply couldn’t demonstrate the imaginative, and counter-intuitive thinking necessary for an H3-type cell. Would we need to conduct psychological evaluations to determine who is suitable for these different groups?
gg) (Prof Hoff) I think that is the wrong way to look at it. I think we need to view these qualifications as trainable traits that we can add to an individual’s repertoires of intellectual skills.
hh) (Mark Blair) There is also the question of emotional attachment to current ways of thinking. How do we teach people to let go of what has worked in the past? How do we teach these traits, and abilities? The company in the real world example created their own market. Doesn’t it take fresh eyes to do this? Can we teach people to regain fresh eyes?
ii) (Halen Allison) First we need to teach “the boss” to sanction dissent on the devils advocate… sort of sanction dissent on dissent.
jj) (Prof Hoff) Mercyhurst has a core curriculum, which includes philosophy, religious studies, social sciences, etc. What purpose does this serve?
kk) (Halen Allison) This over all knowledge is helpful for understanding our environment.
ll) (Prof Hoff) Where are these assumptions articulated? Are they in the college catalogue? How is this curriculum shaping the minds of the students who study it? Is there more value to learning about philosophy, and religion than learning… say accounting? (Prof Hoff was starting to be met with confused stares) You see what I’m doing? I’m trying to ask provocative questions. (Laughter) The point is that the core curriculum is teaching its student multiple ways to view a problem, by exposing them to a variety of paradigms, and giving them the opportunity to engage these issues on multiple fronts. This necessarily gives fresh eyes to the individual.
mm) (Mark Blair) Okay we are developing a curriculum. How do we teach this provocative questioning skill? Are provocative questions the “reset button?”
nn) (Halen Allison) And who will want to acquire this knowledge? Traditionalists may view these new concepts with suspicion.
oo) (Mark Blair) And in fact, can we teach this?
pp) (Prof Hoff) We can come up with examples for this. When you find yourself subscribing to a position, consider the opposite.
qq) (Mark Blair) An ideological red cell? A Hegelian perspective of scientific methods.
rr) (Prof Hoff) Exactly, kind an anti-thesis concept. Can you prove support for the opposite position from where you stand?
4) The Think Tank adjourned, and the members agreed that further discussion of Robson article should be conducted at the next meeting. In addition the think tank agreed to review “Extending Heuer’s Analysis of competing Hypotheses Method to Support Complex Decisions Analysis” by Marco Valtorta, Jiangbo Dang, Hrishikesh Goradia, Jingshan Huang, and Micheal Huhns.
posted by markcblair at 5:34 PM
2 Comments:
Intuition is generally not to be trusted among intelligence analysts, but when time is extremely short, intuition performed by an expert is better than nothing. Of course, as Gary Klein points out in his SOURCES OF POWER, experts can still be wrong when making intuitive decisions, but that often this occurs due to bad information. His case on the USS Vincennes Airbus shootdown is very instructive in that regard. Our problem in intelligence is that we are constantly dealing with bad information—and identifying what information is bad and what is not is not always obvious.
As Mark points out, experts are extremely difficult to challenge, but expertise does not always mean correctness 100% of the time. Expertise means one is more right than wrong more often, but it does not eliminate mistakes. Experts are sometimes wrong. Fools are sometimes right. But fools are almost never right more than they are wrong. The problem is, figuring out what is right and wrong is only obvious in hindsight.
Professor Hoff’s illustration of Cognitive Rigidity regarding bus shelters has a parallel in Gladwell’s BLINK when he discusses the “paradigm” of chairs—and what a comfortable, optimally ergonomically designed chair ought to look like. Until people had experience in the new chair, no matter how flimsy it might have looked, few thought the new chair design had any value. This is the core problem in cognitive ridigidity—it’s hard to take new ideas on the basis of faith, no matter how rational the argument might seem. Our experiences have a “vividness” that transcends rationality. Of course, this assumes one even is given the luxury of being handed a new idea. Asking somebody to develop a new idea out of “whole cloth” in the face of Cognitive Rigidity is the supreme test of mental elasticity—most can’t do it, and of the few who do, even fewer can do it well. We call those people geniuses (e.g., Einstein).
I’d also have to agree that the intelligence field is very much in its infancy as a profession. Despite the plethora of organizations and amount of money spent on it, we have a long way to go to achieve the rigor that medicine applies to problem-solving, for example.
Mark Blair raises some interesting points regarding how to target ideology. This is very hard for an outsider to do, given the problem of cognitive rigidity. Reform/ideological “revolution” probably has to come from the “inside.” The Greek Athenian-style democracy developed cheek by jowl with Spartan oligarchism and helot suppression. Prophets spring forth from and are usually persecuted by their parent religion. Luther was a Catholic monk when he began the Protestant Reformation. Oliver Cromwell was an English parliamentarian who begot the English Civil War. Lincoln was an American who finally put real meaning behind the nearly century-old (by then) American idea that “all men are created equal.” It would be interesting to research how outsiders “diagnosed” the strengths and ills of a particular ideology and how well history bore them out. I must confess that—if it happened with any regularity—one certainly doesn’t hear about it much.
Thus I am to be forgiven for being a bit skeptical that we can target our opponents’ ideology effectively.
Very much taken with the group’s discussion on “provocateurs”—this is a real institutional problem within the intelligence community that it hasn’t truly come to grips with, despite attempts at “red teaming” thorny problems. I argue that as much work should be done at the unclassified level as possible to widen the circle of minds working on the issue and increase the chances of getting “breakthrough” interpretations. One may not recognize it for what it is, but the chance of least “surfacing” unintentional biases may come up.
Regarding Professor Hoff’s questions on why we aim for a well-rounded curriculum is that—for in the intelligence analyst—one of the most powerful tools we have in our business is how to teach ourselves when solving a problem. We have to have a sense of what is wrong and where to look for a solution…and then teach ourselves the solution—whether we learn it from another academic discipline or create a synthesis from a number of things we’ve learned along the way. We are the ultimate mental tool builder—or should be.
The problem is, who teaches us how to do that?
First off, I would like to Thank Col Walters for his contribution to our dialogue. We have all found Col Walters' comments not only insightful, but his suggestions and input have served as guidance for us and have focused and thus so expedited our research. We are indebted to Col Walters and thank him for his contributions.
I would like to address Col Walters’ comments directly: Sir, you made a key point that really hit home with me. You made a distinction between outsiders and insiders. Although your point was made in reference to efforts to target ideology as a foe, I think the point has further reaching implications.
Considering the question of the expert the distinction between outsiders and insiders is of key importance. It is regularly understood that in order to understand a group of people we must understand their culture, history, religion, and social structures. Yet, what is often not understood is that their psychology must be understood. Which is to say, human psychology also varies from culture to culture. Richard E. Nisbett, in The Geography of Thought convincingly demonstrates this point. Empirical research clearly reveals fundamental differences in psychology across cultural lines. Most dramatic are the differences between eastern and western cultures, as is the focus of Nisbett’s book. Mirror imaging biases may not simply be the result of the imposition of cultural values from one society to another, but may also represent the assumption that people of other cultures mentally assess queries in the same manner. Nisbett points out that eastern people use inclusive dialectic reasoning while western people use exclusive logical reasoning.
Even if an expert were able to study and understand every facet of a society he would still not possess the innate understanding of a native. Which is to say, an expert may be able to understand the eccentricities of a culture, but he/she could never fully understand the experience of the culture. The question then becomes: “When might this limitation result in a failure of analysis?”
We may also apply this line of thinking to the concepts of Cognitive Rigidity. When we consider the Bus Shelter scenario we are presented with a similar concept. In this case the “insider” (the company that dominated the bus shelter market) was at a disadvantage because it lacks the experience of being on the “outside” trying to get in. Without having the same antecedents and consequences humans are not likely to behave, including think, in a similar manner. In other words the insider has an innate and tested understanding of his environment and it is difficult to “lose” that understanding in order to think like an outsider.
In reference to concepts of affecting ideologies I have to contradict myself. If we wish to target the adoption and replication of “unfavorable” ideologies, an understanding of the differences between peoples is likely inadequate for reaching such goals. In fact, understanding universal principals of human psychology/sociology is more appropriate for reaching such goals. I agree with Col Walters that the insertion of a competing ideologies from outside sources is unlikely to achieve the desired results. In order to affect ideologies our approach must be multi-faceted. We must modify an ideologies environment. Competing ideologies already exists in cultural environments. And these ideologies must reflect that culture in order to be successfully adopted by large numbers of people. There are many factors, which make one ideology more successful than others. These factors are what we must modify in order to affect the adoption and replication of ideologies. Furthermore, human societies have natural cyclic transitions between ideologies (i.e. republican, democratic ideologies, etc). The key is to be able to slow down and speed up these cycles, slowing periods of favorable ideologies, and speeding up periods where unfavorable ideologies are dominant. Unfortunately, many environmental factors for ideologies are economically, or culturally based (i.e. class differences/cast systems). Extremist ideologies thrive in environments where people have low feelings of self-efficacy. Poverty is simply too formidable of a foe for solutions that can be enacted in the short-term. However, significant research exists to give us hope that we may be able to achieve some results in reducing the success of one ideology, while increasing the success of others.
All in all Col Walters points are well taken. When attempting to further the practice of intelligence I believe must not only ask the question how do we assess queries, but also why? What makes one assessment appear more valid than another? In order words what makes one assessment more successful to us than another? So we have a two-fold task for the future of intelligence analysis: First to ensure that the “right” answers to intelligence queries are present in the many possibilities of the assessments of said queries; and secondly to ensure that the “right” answers are most successful or most obvious of all the possible outcomes of an assessment.
Post a Comment
<< Home